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MITRE ATT&CK Framework: How the Matrix Works, With One Real Intrusion

Since 2013, MITRE has kept the ATT&CK framework, a public knowledge base of attacker behavior seen in real intrusions, sorted into tactics (the goal) and techniques (the how). Version 20.1, current since October 13, 2026, lists 15 Enterprise tactics, 227 techniques and 479 sub-techniques.

A printer's type case with 15 columns, some compartments blue or amber, labelled with ATT&CK v20.1 and T1621
Tactics are the columns; a technique such as T1621 sits under the goal it serves.

The count changed in April 2026. ATT&CK v19 split Defense Evasion in two: TA0005 is now Stealth, and TA0112 Defense Impairment is new. A mapping made before then has 14 tactics. The Mobile and ICS matrices, 12 tactics each, use the same model.

Scattered Spider, mapped tactic by tactic

CISA and FBI advisory AA23-320A maps the group to ATT&CK v17. We took one technique per tactic and re-opened each technique page on November 18, 2026.

Scattered Spider across the 15 Enterprise tactics, ATT&CK v20.1

  1. TA0043 Reconnaissance

    T1598.004 Spearphishing Voice

  2. TA0042 Resource Development

    T1583.001 Domains

  3. TA0001 Initial Access

    T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice

  4. TA0002 Execution

    T1204 User Execution

  5. TA0003 Persistence

    T1078 Valid Accounts

  6. TA0004 Privilege Escalation

    T1484.002 Trust Modification

    Changed since v17

  7. TA0005 Stealth

    T1684.001 Impersonation

    Changed since v17

  8. TA0112 Defense Impairment

    T1556.006 Multi-Factor Authentication

    Changed since v17

  9. TA0006 Credential Access

    T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation

  10. TA0007 Discovery

    T1538 Cloud Service Dashboard

  11. TA0008 Lateral Movement

    T1021.007 Cloud Services

  12. TA0009 Collection

    T1213.002 Sharepoint

  13. TA0011 Command and Control

    T1219 Remote Access Tools

    Changed since v17

  14. TA0010 Exfiltration

    T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

  15. TA0040 Impact

    T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

Tactic (v20.1) Technique (v20.1) What the advisory describes Changed since v17
TA0043 Reconnaissance T1598.004 Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice Calls staff to collect details
TA0042 Resource Development T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains Registers look-alike company domains for phishing
TA0001 Initial Access T1566.004 Phishing: Spearphishing Voice Calls the IT help desk to reset a password or MFA
TA0002 Execution T1204 User Execution Talks employees into running a remote access tool
TA0003 Persistence T1078 Valid Accounts Keeps real accounts after password changes
TA0004 Privilege Escalation T1484.002 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Trust Modification Adds its own federated identity provider to the SSO tenant, with automatic account linking Name changed (v17: Domain Policy Modification: Domain Trust Modification)
TA0005 Stealth T1684.001 Social Engineering: Impersonation Poses as IT or help-desk staff ID and tactic changed (v17: T1656 Impersonation, Defense Evasion)
TA0112 Defense Impairment T1556.006 Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication Registers or changes MFA tokens on stolen accounts New tactic (the advisory files it under Persistence)
TA0006 Credential Access T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation Sends repeated MFA prompts until someone accepts
TA0007 Discovery T1538 Cloud Service Dashboard Uses a cloud inventory service to pick targets
TA0008 Lateral Movement T1021.007 Remote Services: Cloud Services Moves into existing cloud instances (lateral movement, hop by hop)
TA0009 Collection T1213.002 Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint Searches SharePoint repositories
TA0011 Command and Control T1219 Remote Access Tools Controls hosts through remote access tools Name changed (v17: Remote Access Software)
TA0010 Exfiltration T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Copies data to cloud storage (the advisory lists it under Impact)
TA0040 Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact Encrypts VMware ESXi servers for ransom

Source: CISA AA23-320A Tables 4 to 17; IDs checked on attack.mitre.org, ATT&CK v20.1, November 18, 2026.

Anatomy of one technique page

One technique page holds every layer of the model. Here is T1621.

attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621/, v20.1
Tactic
TA0006 Credential Access
The why: the attacker wants credentials, or a way past them
Technique
T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
The how: send MFA requests until a person approves one
Sub-techniques
None for T1621
A more specific how. T1556 has nine, including T1556.006 from the table
Platforms
IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows, macOS
Where the technique applies
Procedure examples
G1015 Scattered Spider, G0016 APT29, G1004 LAPSUS$
Observed use, each with a cited report
Mitigations
M1036 Account Use Policies, M1032 Multi-factor Authentication, M1017 User Training
What MITRE says reduces the risk
Detection strategy
DET0160, with analytics AN0449 to AN0454
What to look for in identity, cloud and host logs
Version
1.2, last modified October 24, 2025
The version to cite when you map a control to it

MITRE replaced “data sources” with detection strategies, analytics and data components in v18 (October 2025).

What is MITRE ATT&CK used for?

Teams use ATT&CK to measure detection coverage, to test controls against behavior attackers have actually used, and to describe both in one vocabulary. The IDs are the shared key: a SOC rule and a government advisory can both point at T1621 and mean the same behavior.

  1. Map your detection coverage

    Tag each detection rule with its technique ID, then walk the 15 rows. A row with no rule is a named gap.

  2. Test controls against a real adversary

    AA23-320A gives the loop: pick a technique, test your tools against it, analyze detection and prevention, and tune.

  3. Report in shared terms

    Write findings as technique IDs with the ATT&CK version. CISA’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping keeps analysts consistent.

Identity techniques and the controls that answer them

Each record pairs a MITRE mitigation for an identity row with the SSOGEN control behind it.

  • T1621, mitigation M1032: replace one-tap push with a number from the login screen, and limit prompts.The SSOGEN Authenticator shows six numbers and the person taps the one on the sign-in page. No setting turns number matching off. By default, 3 denials pause push for 15 minutes, and one person can start 5 requests per 10 minutes.
  • T1078, mitigations M1032 and M1036: MFA on every account, plus conditional access.With the sign-in strength Passkey or security key, only a credential that cannot be phished counts. The Admin Console always takes a second factor.
  • T1484.002 and T1556, mitigation M1047: audit authentication settings.Account matching for an identity provider needs a super administrator and a sign-in restriction with a required claim. SSOGEN joins only on a verified email, never joins an administrator’s account, and records every change in the hash-chained audit log.

The user’s side of push bombing is in MFA fatigue attacks.

Identity providersRefused
SSOGEN account matching set to Sign in to the existing account, which needs a required claim in the provider's restriction
The T1484.002 row in practice: no account matching until the provider's restriction requires a claim.

Every joining rule is in account matching for identity providers.

ATT&CK compared with other models

What is the difference between MITRE ATT&CK and the Cyber Kill Chain?

The two are complementary: the kill chain uses ordered phases for high-level objectives, while ATT&CK describes behavior one level lower, with tactics in no fixed order. MITRE’s FAQ adds that a single intrusion may not use every tactic. The phases themselves are explained in the cyber kill chain.

Is ATT&CK a control framework?

No. ATT&CK describes attacker behavior; a control framework lists the controls a security program should have. Three common control frameworks are NIST CSF 2.0, ISO/IEC 27001 and the CIS Critical Security Controls v8.1. Use them together: the control framework sets the controls, and ATT&CK shows which techniques each control has to stop.

How do you learn the MITRE ATT&CK framework?

Start from one report you already have, not from the full matrix. Take an advisory such as AA23-320A and open each technique ID it cites on attack.mitre.org. Read each page’s procedure examples and mitigations, and note the ATT&CK version you read.

Sources, all read 2026-11-18: MITRE ATT&CK versions, v20 release notes, v19 release notes, Enterprise tactics, Enterprise matrix, FAQ, data sources, T1621, T1078, T1556, T1484.002, T1684.001; CISA and FBI advisory AA23-320A, Scattered Spider (November 16, 2023, last revised July 29, 2025); CISA, Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping; NIST Cybersecurity Framework; CIS Critical Security Controls.

Updated